The term "global health" is rapidly replacing the older terminology of "in- 
titles of books aiicl ailicles in recent medical aiid public health literature suggests tliat aii important transition is under way. The terms "global," "globalization," and tlieir variants are eveiywhere. and in the specific context of Internationa! public health, "global" seems to be emerging as the prelen-ed authoritative tenn.' As one indicator, the number of entiles in PubMed under the rubrics "global health" and "international health" shows that "global health'' is rapidly on the rise, seemingly on track to overtake "international health" in the near future (Table 1) . Altliough universities, government agencies, and private philanthropies are all using the term in highly visible ways." the origin and meaning of the term "global health" are still unclear
We provide historical insight into the emergence of the terminology of global health. We believe tliat an examination of this linguistic shift will yield important Ihiit. and not just infonnation about fashions and fads in language use. Our task here is to provide a critical analysis of the meaning, emergence, and significance of the term "global health" and to place its growing populai"-ity in a broader historical context. In particular, we focus on tlic role of the World Health Organization (WHO) in both international and glohal health and as an agent in the h-ansition fmm one concept to the other.
Let us first define and differentiate some essential terms. "InternationaJ healtli" was already a term of eonsiderable currency in the late I9tb and early 20th century, when it refeiTed primarily to a ibcus on the conti"ol of epidemics across the boundaries between nations (i.e., "international"). "Intergovernmental" refers to tlie relationships between the governments of sovereign nations-in this case, with regaixi to the policies and |)i-actices of public healtli. "Global healtli." in general, implies consideration of the health needs of the people of the whole planet above tiie concerns of particular nations. The tenn "glohal" is also associated Vkitli the growing importance of actore heyond governmental or intei^ovemmental organizations and agencies-for example, the media, internationally influential ibundations. nongovernmental organizations, and transnational coiporations. Logically, the terms "international," "intergovernmental," and "global" need not be mutually exclusive and in fact can be understood as complementary. Thas, we could say that WHO is an intergovernmental agency that exercises international dincdoas with the goal of improving global health.
Given these definitions, it should come as no surprise that global health is not entirely an invention of the past few years. The term "glohal" was sometimes used well before the 1990s, as in the "global malaria eradication program" launched by WHO in the mid-1950s; a WHO Public Affairs Committee pamphlet of 1958.
Hie World Healtli Organization: Its Global Battle Against Disease^; a use in official statements and documents spoj-adic at best. Now tliere is an increasing frequency of references to global health.'^ Yet the questions t^niain; How many have participated in this shift in tenninology? Do they consider it trendy, trivial, or trenchant? Supinda Hunyavanich and Ruth B. Walkup tried to answer these questions and published, under the provocative title "US Public Heaith Leaders Shift Toward a New Paradigm of Glohal Health," their report of conversations conducted in 1999 with 29 "intemational heaith leaders,"T heir respondents fell into 2 groups. About half felt that there was no need for a new terminology and that tlie label "global health" was meaningiess jai'gon. The other half tliought that there were profound differences between intemadonai health and global health and that "global" clearly meant sometliing transnational. Although these respondents believed that a major shift had occurred within the previous few years, they seemed imable cleaily to articulate or define it.
In 1998, Dereit Yach and Douglas Bettcher came closer to capturing both tbe essence and the origin of the new global health in a 2-part article on "The Globalization of Public Health" in the
American Journal of Public
Health." They defined the "new paradigm" of globalization as "the process of increasing economic, political, and social intei-dependence and integration as capital, goods, persons, concepts, images, ideas and values cross state boundaries." TTie roots of globalization were long, they said, going back at least to the 19th century, but the process was assuming a new magnitude in the late 20th century, 'Hie globalization of public health, they argued, had a dual aspect, one both promising and threatening, 111 one respect, there was easier diffusion of useful technologies and of ideas aiid values such as human rights. In another, there were such risks as diminished social safety nets; the facilitated mariceting of tobacco, alcohol, and psychoactive dmgs; the easier worldwide spread of infectious diseases; and the rapid degradation of the environment, with dangerous public health consequences. But Yach and Bettcher were convinced that WHO could tuni these risks into opportunities. WHO, they argued, could help create more efficient information and surveillance systems by strengthening its global monitoring ajid alert systems, thus creating "global early waming systems," They believed that even the most powerful nations would buy into this new globally interdependent world system once these nations realized that such involvement was in their best interest.
Despite the long list of problems and tiireats, Yach and Bettcher were largely uncridcal as they promoted the virtues of global public health and the leadership role of WHO, In an editorial in the same Lssue of the Journal, George Silver noted that Yach and Bettcher worked for WHO and tiiat their position was similai" to otlier optimistic stances taken by WHO officials and advocates. But WHO, Silver pointed out, was actually in a bad way: "The WHO'S leadei-ship role has pas,sed to tlie fai' wealthier ajid more influential World Bank, and the WHO'S mission has been dispersed among other UN agencies," Wealthy donor countries were billions of doUars in arrears, and this left the United Nations and its agencies in "disarray, hamstrung by financial constraints and internal incompetendes. ftustrated by turf wars and crossnational polides."" Given these -realities, Yach anti Bettcher's promotion of "global public health" while they were afiiliated with WHO was. to say the least, intriguing. Why were these spokesmen for the much-criticized and apparently hobbled WHO so upbeat about "global" public health?
THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION The Early Years
To Picks up variant lerm endings (e.g. "international" also picks up "internationalize" and "internationalization"; "glotiar also picks up "globalise" and "globaliiation"). 'Number for 55 months only. more generally, it will be helpful to review the history of the organization from 1948 to 1998, as it tnoved from being the unquestioned leader of ijitemational health to searching for its place in the contested world of global health.
WHO Mediteiranean, Western I'adfic, and Africa-but it did not fully implement this regionalization mitil the 1950s-Although an "intemational" and "intergovernmental" mindset prevailed in the 1940s and 1950s, naming the new organization the IVorld Health Organization also raised sights to a worldwide, "global" perspective, 'Hie first director general of WHO. Brock Chisholm. was a Canadian psychiatrist loosely identified with the British social medicint^ tradition-The United States, a main contributor to the Wl 10 budget played a cotilradictoiy role: on the one hand, it supported the UN system with its broad worldwide goals, but on the other, it was jealous of its sovereignty and maintained the right to intervene unilaterally in the Americas in the name of national security. Another pmblem for WHO was that its constitution had to be ratified by nation states. a slow process: by 1949. only 14 coimtries had signed on. '
As ati intei^ovemmental agency. WHO had to be responsive to the larger political environment-The politics of the Cold Wa]-had a particular salience, with an unmistakable impact on WHO policies and personnel Thus, when the Soviet Union and other communist countries walked out of the UN system and therefore out of WHO in 1949, the UTiited States and its allies were easily able to exert a dominating influence. In 1953. Chisholm completed his term as direc-tor general ajid was I'eplaced by the Bi-aziiian Marcoliiio Candau. Caiidau. wbo had worked under Soper on malaria control in Brazil, was associated first witli the "vertical'' disease control programs of the Rockefeller Foundation and then with their adoption by the Fan American Saiiitaiy Bureau when Soper moved to tliat agency as director"' Candau would be director general of WHO for over 20 years. From 1949 20 years. From until 1956 . when the Soviet Union returned to the UN and WHO, WHO was closely allied with US intca'sts.
In 1955, Candau was charged with overseeing WHO's campaign of malaria eradication, approved that year by the World Health Assembly. The ambitious goal of malaiia ei-adicatioii had been conceived and promoted in (he context of gi-eal enlbusiasm and optimi.sm about the ability of widespread DDT spraying to kill mosquitoes. As Randall Packard has argued, the United States and its allies believed that global malaria eradication would usher in economic growth and create overseas markets for US technology and manufactured goods.'' It would build support for local governments and Uieir US supporters and help win "hearts and minds" in the battle against Communism. Miiroring then-current development theories, the campaign promoted technologies brought in from outside and made no attempt to enlist the participation of local populations in planning or implementation. This model of development assistance fit neatly into US Cold War effoits to promote modernization with limited social reform."Ŵ ith the T-etuni of the Soviet Union and other communist countries in 1956. tlie political balance in tlie World Health Assembly shifted and C^andau accomiTiodated the changed balance of power Diu-ing tlie 1960s, malaria eradication was facing serious difficulties in the field; ultimately, it would suffer colossal cUid embairassing failures. In 1969, the World HealOi Assembly, declaring (hat it was not feasible to eradicate malaiia in many parts of the world, began a slow process of reversal, returning once again (o an older malai-ia control agenda. 'ITiis time, however, there was a new twist; Uie 1969 assembly emphasized the need to develop rnral health systems and to integrate malaiia control into general health semces.
When the Soviet Union returned to WHO, its representative at the assembly was the national deputy minister of health.
He ai'gued Uiat it was now scientitieally feasible, socially desirable, and econoinically worthwhile to attempt to eradicate smallpox worldwide.''' The Soviet Union wanted to make its mark on global health, and Candau, recognizing the shifting balance of power, was willing to cooperate. The Soviet Union and Cuba agreed to provide 25 million and 2 million doses of freeze-dried vaccine, respectively; in 1959, the World Health Assembly committed itself to a global smallpox eradication program. 'ITiis changing political environment was reflected in corresponding shifts within WHO. In the 1960s, WHO acknowledged that a strengthened health infrastructure was prerequisite to the success of malaria control programs, especially in Africa, ln 1968, Candau called for a comprehensive and integrated plan for curative and preventive care services. A Soviet representative called for an organizational study of methods for promoting the development of basic health services.'^ In January 1971, the Executive Board of the World Health Assembly agreed to undertake this study, and its results were presented to the assembly in 1973."^ Socrates Litsios has discussed many of the steps in the transformation of WHO's approach from an older model of health services to what would become tbe "Primary Health Care" approach.'^' This new model drew upon the thinking and experiences of nongovernmental organizations and medical missionaries working in Africa. Asia, and Latin America at the grassroots level. It also gained saliency from China's reentry into the UN in 1973 and the widespread interest in Chinese "barefoot doctors," who were reported to be transforming lural health conditions. These experiences underscored the urgency of a "Primary Health Care" perspective that included the training of community healtli workers and tbe resolution of basic economic and environmental problems.^'' 'ITiese new approaches were spearheaded by Halfdan T, Mahler, a Dane, who served as director general of W' l 10 from from the Soviet delegate to the executive bom-d, Mahler agi-eed to hold a major conference on the organization of health services in Alma-Ata, in the Soviet Union. Maiilcr was initially reluctant because he disagreed with the Soviet Union's highly centralized and mt^dicalized approach to the provision of health services.*^' The Soviet Union succeeded in hosting Uie September 1978 conference, hut the conference itself reflected Mahler's views much more closely than it did those of the Soviets. The Declaration of Primary Health Care and Ihe goal of "Health lor All in the Year 2000" advocated an "intersectoral" and multiciimensional approach to health and socioeconomic development, emphasized the use of "appropriate technology'," and lilted active community participation in health care and heaith education at every David Tejada de Rivero has argued that "It is regi-ettable that afterwai-d the impatience of some international agencies, both UN and private, and their emphasis on achieving tangible results instead of promoting change ... led to major distortions of the original concept of primary health care."""' A number of governments, agencies, and individuals saw WHO's idealistic view of Priniaiy Health Care as "unrealistic" and unattainable. 'Yhe process of reducing Alma-Ata's idealism to a practical set of technical interventions that could be implemented and measured more easily began in 1979 at a small conference-hea\'ily influenced by US attendees and policies-held in Bellagio, Italy, and spoasoi-ed by the Rockefeller Foundation, with assistance from the World Bank. Those in attendance included tlie president of the World Bank, the vice president of the Ford Foundation, the administrator of USAID, and the executive secretaiy of UNICtiF'"
The Bellagio meeting focused on an alternative concept to that aiticulated at Alma-Ata-"Selective Primary Health Care"-which was built on the notion of pragmatic, low-cost intei-vention.s that were limited in scope and easy to monitor and evaluate. Thanks primaiily to UNICEF, Selective Primary Health Care was soon operationalized under the acronym '"GOBI" (Growth monitoring to fight malnutrition in children. Oral rehydration techniques to defeat diairheal diseases. Breastfeeding to protect children, and Immunizations)."
In the 1980s, WHO had to reckon with the growing influence of the World Bank. The bank had initially been fornied in 1946 to assist in the reconstRiction of F' Airope and later expanded its mandate to provide loans, grants, and technical assistance to developing countries. At fii-st, it funded large investments in physical capital and infi-astmcture; in the t970s, however, it began to invest in population control, health, and education, with an emphasis on population control.'^ 'Hie Wbrid Bank approved its first loan for family planning in 1970. In 1979, ihe World Bank created a Population, Health, and Nutrition Department and adopted a policy of funding both stand-alone health pi'ograms and health components of other projects.
In its 1980 World Development Report, the Bank argued that both malnutrition and ill health could be countered by direci government action-with World Bank assistance.*' it also suggested that improving health and nutiidon could accelerate economic Crisis at WHO, 1988 WHO, -1998 The first citizen of japan ever elected to head a UN agency, Nakajima rapidly became the most controversial director general in WHO'S history. His nomination had not been supported by the United States or by a number of European and Latin American countries, and his performance in office did little to assuage their doubts. Nakajima did try to launch several important initiatives-on tobacco, global disease surveillance, and public-private partnershipsbut fierce criticism persisted that raised questions about his autocratic style and poor management, his inability to communicate efFecdvely. and. worst of all. cronyism and corruption.
Another symptom of WHO's problems in the late 1980s was the growth of "extrabudgetary" Rinding. As Gill Walt of the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine noted, there was a crucial shift from predominant reliance on WHO's "regular budget"-drawn from member states' contributions on the basis of population size and gross national product-to greatly increased dependence on extrabudgetary funding coming from donations by multilateral agencies or "donor" nations. ^ By the period 1986-1987. extrabudgetary funds of $437 million had almost caught up with the regular budget of $543 million. By the beginning of the 1990s, extrabudgetary funding had overtaken the regulai" budget by $21 million, contributing 54% of WIIO's overall budget.
Enormous problems for the organization followed from this budgetary shift. Priorities and policies were still ostensibly set by the World Health Assembly, which was made up of all member nations. The assembly, however, now dominated numerically hy poor and developing countries, had authority only over the regular budget, frozen since the early 1980s. Wealthy donor nations and multilateral agencies like the World Bank could largely call the shots on the use of the extrabudgetary funds they contributed. Thtis, they created, in effect, a series of "vertical" programs more or less independent of the rest of WHO's programs and dedsionmaking structure. The dilemma for the organization was tliat although the extrabudgetary funds added to the overall budget, "they [increased] difficulties of coordination and continuity, [caused] unpredictability in finance, and a great deal of dependence on the satisfaction of particular donors,'"*" as Gill Walt explained.
Fiona Godlee published a series of articles in 1994 and 1995 that huitt on Walt's critique."" She concluded with this dire assessment: "WHO is caught in a cycle of decline, with donors expressing their lack of faith in its central management by placing funds outside the management's control. This has prevented WHO from [developing] ... integrated responses to countries' long term needs.""*'
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the World Bank moved confidently into the vacuum created by an increasingly ineffective WHO. WHO officials were unable or unwilling to respond to the new international political economy structured around neoliheral approaches to economics, ticide, and politics.''"^ The Bank maintained that existing health systems were often wasteful, inefficient, and ineffective, and it argued in favor of greater reliance on private-sector health care provision and the reduction of public involvement in health services delivery.
Controversies surrounded the World Bank's policies and practices, but there was no doubt that. by the early 1990s, it had become a dominant force in international health. 'Ilie Bank's greatest "comparative advantage" lay in its ability to mobilize large financial resources. By 1990, the Bank's loans for health surpassed WHO's total budget, and by the end of 1996, the Bank's aimuladve lending portfolio in health, nutrition, and population had reached $13.5 billion. Yet the Bank recognized that, whereas it had gieat economic strengths and influence, WHO still had considerable technical expertise in matters of health and medicine. This was dearly reflected in the Bank's widely influential World Development Report. 1993 : Investing in Health, in which credit is given to WHO, "a ftill partner with the World Bank at every step of the preparation of the Report."^^ Circumstances suggested that it was to the advantage of both paities for the World Bank and WHO to work together.
WHO EMBRACES "GLOBAL HEALTH"
This is the context in which WHO hegan to refashion itself as a coordinator, strategic planner, and leader of "global health" initiatives. In January 1992, the 31-memher Executive Board of the World Health Assembly decided to appoint a "working group" to recommend how WHO could be most effective in international health work in light of the "global change" rapidly overtaking the world. The executive board may have been responding, in part, to the Children's Vaccine Initiative, perceived within WHO as an attempted "coup" hy UNICEF, the World Bank, the UN Development Pmgrani, the Rockefeller Foundation, and several other players seekijig to wrest control of vaccine development.''^ The working gnnip's final report of May 1993 recommended that WHO-if it was to maintain leadership of the health sectfir-must overhaul its fragmented management of global, regional, and country programs, diminish the competition between regular and extrabudgetary programs, and, above all. increase the emphasis within WHO on global health issues and WHO'S coordinating role in that domain.""' Until that time, the term "global health" had been used sporadically and, outside WHO. usually by people on the political left with various "world" agendas. In 1990. G, A. Gellert of International Physicians for the fVevention of Nuclear War had called for analyses of "global health intt'Riependence.""''' In the same year, Milton and Ruth Roemer argued that further improvements in "global health" would bf dependent on the expansion of puhlic rather than private health services."*" Another strong source for the tei-m "global health" was the environmental movement, esperially debates over world environmental degradation, global warming, and their potentially devastating effects on human health.'''
In the mid-1990s, a considerable body of literature was produced on global health threats. Biiindtland also began to sti-engthen WHO's linaneial position, largely by oi^anizing "global partnerships" and "global funds" to bring together "stakeholdei"s"-private donors, governments, and bilateral and multilateral agencies-to concentrate on specific targets (for example. Roll Back Malaria in 1998, the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization in 1999, and Stop TB in 2001) . These were semiautonomous progi^ams bringing in substantial outside funding, often in the fonn of "public-private paitnerships.""" A veiy significant player in these partiierships was the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, which committed more thaji $1.7 billion between 1998 and 2000 to an international program to prevent or eLminate diseases in Uie world's poorest nations, mainly through vaccines and immunization programs.Ŵ ithin a few years, some 70 "global health partnerships" had been created.
Bmnddand's tcnui-e as director general was not without blemish nor free from criticism. Some of tlie initiatives cretlited to her administi'ation had actually been started under Nakajima (for example, the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control), others may be looked upon today with some skepticism (the Commission on Macroeconomics and Health, Roll Back Malaria), and still others ai'giiably did not receive enough attention fi-0Tn her administration (Primaiy Health Care, HIV/AIDS, Healtli and Human Rights, aiid Child Health). NonetJieless, few would dis[)ute the assertion that Bmndtland succeeded in achieving her principal objective, wbich was to reposition WHO as a credible and highly visible contributor to tlie rapidly changing field of global health.
CONCLUSION
We can now return briefly lo the questions implied at the beginning of this article: how does a historical perspective help us understand the emergence of tlie tenninology of "global health" and what role did WHO play as an agent in its development? The basic answers derive from the fact that WT^O at various times in its history alternatively led, reflected, and tried to acconmiodate broader changes and challenges in the evershifting world of international health. In the 1950s and 1960s, when changes in biology, economics, and great power politics transformed foreign relations and public health, WHO moved from a nan"ow emphasis on malaria eradication to a broader interest in the development of health services and the emerging concentration on smallpox eradication. In the 1970s and 1980s, WHO developed the concept of Primary Health Care but then ti.trned from zealous advocacy to (he pragmatic promotion of Selective Primary Health Care as complex changes overtook intraand interorganizational dynamics and altered the international economic and political order. In the 1990s, WHO attempted to use leadership of an emerging concern with "global health" as an oi^anizational strategy tliat promised survival and, indeed, renewal.
But just as it did not invent the eradicationist or primary care agendas, WHO did not invent "global health"; other, larger forces were responsible. WHO certainly did help promote interest in global health and contributed significantly to the dissemination of new concepts and a new vocabulaiy. In that process, it was hoping to acquire, as Yach and Bettcher suggested in 1998, a restored coordinating and leadership role. Whether WHO's organizational repositioning will serve to reestablish it as the unquestioned steward of the health of the world's population, and bow this mission will be effected in practice, remains an open question at this time.
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